


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


4 September 1962

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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8. Brazil: Crisis expected in mid-September. (*Page vi*)

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\*Algeria: The odds still seem to be against a military showdown, although neither side has shown any willingness to come to terms.

The civilians in Algeria reportedly are making increasingly outspoken demands for a truce and early elections, and most of the factions are courting them with peaceful propaganda. Civilian support for Ben Bella, according to the US consul general, has declined to the point where he could take the city only by force or threat of force.

Efforts by the various factions to outface each other in and around Algiers are likely to result in continued skirmishes. [REDACTED]

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\*Congo: Tshombé has accepted the UN's reconciliation plan as "the basis of an acceptable settlement," but has left numerous loopholes for putting off implementation.

Katangan leaders may use the recent inclusion of a detachment of Leopoldville troops in the UN contingent in northern Katanga as justification for delay.

Tshombé's acceptance statement, was, however, more positive than had been expected, particularly in agreeing to an even division of Katanga's revenues between the Leopoldville and Elisabethville governments. [REDACTED]

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4 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

v

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Brazil: There is general expectation in Brazil of a new political crisis in mid-September. Communists say they have reports that right-wing elements plan a coup between 10 and 15 September.

Some anti-Communist leaders believe Goulart, bent on restoring a strong presidency, may close Congress, cancel the 7 October congressional elections, and attempt military rule. Brazilian armed forces leaders are sharply divided in their attitudes toward Goulart and military intervention.

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4 Sept 62

DAILY BRIEF

vi

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### Brazilians Expect Mid-September Crisis

Political tensions in Brazil may come to a head between 10 and 15 September, the period parliamentary leaders have set for a meeting of Congress in Brasilia to consider the plebiscite Goulart demands on restoration of a strong presidency. Technically Congress is in session until 15 December, but with campaigning under way for the election of a new chamber on 7 October, there is considerable doubt that a quorum can be assembled in the new hinterland capital.

Brazil's leading anti-Communist, Governor Carlos Lacerda, reportedly anticipates serious disorders during the coming month, and doubts that Congress will take the action Goulart wants. He thinks that as a result the cabinet will fall in mid-September, and that Goulart at that point will direct the armed forces to maintain order, close Congress, and call off the election.

Aside from reports that some pro-Communist candidates are not campaigning very hard, there are no other indications that Goulart may plan to cancel the election. His Brazilian Labor party, while it is given no chance of winning a majority, stands to make some gains. The President has given indications, however, that he would like to close down the present Congress before the end of its tenure.

The Executive Commission of the Brazilian Communist party. [redacted]

[redacted] was holding a three-day session to discuss plans for Communist action in the event of "trouble" during the proposed session of Congress when it received a report that Brazilian right-wing elements

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were planning to stage a coup between 10 and 15 September. The commission decided to publish the report and to draft new contingency instructions for counteraction by party assets in case the coup materializes.

Goulart himself will probably compound the existing tensions by stimulating labor disorders if he does not have his way with Congress.

The armed forces leaders have one faction which is inclined to back Goulart under most circumstances, and a second, [redacted]

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[redacted] which is strongly opposed to him. A center group, [redacted]

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[redacted] is reluctant to take action outside the constitution or embroil the armed forces in politics, but would intervene to restore order if the situation became chaotic. In any such crisis this center group might support Goulart's resumption of full presidential powers as a means of stopping short of a full military take-over. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Emergency Planning

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

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The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

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